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DE FACTO SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
JEFF SCHWARTZ∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 For generations, scholars have debated the purpose of 
corporations.  Should they maximize shareholder value or balance 
shareholder interests against the corporation’s broader social and 
economic impact?  A longstanding and fundamental premise of this 
debate is that, ultimately, it is up to corporations to decide.  But 
this understanding is obsolete.  Securities law robs corporations of 
this choice.  Once corporations go public, the securities laws 
effectively require that corporations maximize share price at the 
expense of all other goals.  This Article will be the first to identify 
the profound impact that the securities laws have on the purpose 
of public firms—a phenomenon that it calls “de facto shareholder 
primacy.” 
 The Article will make three primary contributions to the 
literature.  First, it will provide a rich and layered account of de 
facto shareholder primacy.  The phenomenon is not the result of 
considered legislation and regulatory decision.  Rather, hedge-
fund activists leverage the transparency that the securities laws 
afford to identify, and force companies to adopt, strategies that 
increase share prices.  Their activities cast a shadow over the 
public market.  Because firms must maximize share prices or face 
costly, disruptive, and protracted battles with activist hedge funds, 
they preemptively focus solely on stock values.  The activists’ novel 
and opportunistic use of the securities laws has transformed the 
regulatory apparatus into a powerful lever of shareholder 
primacy.  Second, this Article will show how this distortion of the 
regulations causes harm.  Activist interventions bring the laws into 
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conflict with principles of federalism and private ordering, which 
hurts entrepreneurs, investors, and equity markets.  Finally, to 
address these concerns, this Article will recommend that hedge 
funds report their holdings in target firms earlier than currently 
required.  This small change to the securities laws would end 
hedge-fund activism and thereby disentangle the securities laws 
from corporate purpose. 
 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 654 
I.  THEORIES OF THE FIRM AND CORPORATE PURPOSE ......................... 659 
A.  “Nexus of Contracts” and Shareholder Primacy .................. 659 
B.  “Entity” Theory and Stakeholder Theory ............................. 662 
C.  Shareholder Primacy Reimagined—Long-Term Shareholder 
Value and Efficient Markets ............................................... 664 
D.  An Unsettled Debate ............................................................ 668 
E.  Corporate Law and Theories of Corporate Purpose ............. 669 
II.  DE FACTO SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND THE SECURITIES LAWS .. 672 
A.  The Basic Structure of Securities Regulation ....................... 673 
B.  Securities Law’s Expansive Potential................................... 675 
C.  The Shifting Equity Market Landscape ................................ 675 
D.  The Strategy of Hedge-Fund Activists ................................. 679 
E.  De Facto Shareholder Primacy ............................................. 681 
F.  The Market Shadow of Hedge Fund Activism ..................... 685 
G.  Why De Facto Shareholder Primacy Is Different ................. 687 
H.  Hedge-Fund Activism as a Mechanism of De Facto 
Shareholder Primacy ........................................................... 689 
I.  Critique of De Facto Shareholder Primacy ............................ 691 
III.  A NEW LENS FOR HEDGE-FUND ACTIVISM .................................... 694 
A.  The Cost-Benefit Framework ............................................... 695 
B.  The Social-Welfare Calculus ................................................ 696 
C.  Reforms to Eliminate Hedge-Fund Activism ....................... 697 
IV.  CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 699 
 
 
654 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:652 
INTRODUCTION 
Now more than ever, public corporations play an essential role in 
society.1  They have an enormous impact on politics,2 social issues,3 the 
environment,4 and the economy.5  Given their immense footprint, there are 
few questions with greater social-welfare implications than whether 
corporations exist solely to serve the interests of shareholders (a shareholder 
primacy perspective)6 or whether they have broader responsibilities (a 
stakeholder perspective).7 
                                                          
 1.  See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 86 (2012) (“Corporations . . . control 
more resources than many national governments . . . .”); Gabriel Rauterberg, The Corporation’s 
Place in Society, 114 MICH. L. REV. 913, 913 (2016) (“The public corporation is usurping the state’s 
role as the most important institution of wealthy capitalist societies.”). 
 2.  Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission held that corporations can make unlimited 
political contributions.  See 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. 
Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO. L. REV. 923, 927 (2013) 
(presenting evidence that “public companies engage in substantial political spending”). 
 3.  See Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1535 (2018) 
(“Corporations . . . are at the forefront of some of the most contentious and important social issues 
of our time.”). 
 4.  See, e.g., S&P GLOBAL, S&P DOW JONES INDICES CARBON EMITTER SCORECARD 3 Ex.1 
(2016), https://us.spindices.com/documents/research/research-carbon-scorecard-april-2016.pdf 
(showing that the carbon emissions of the public companies tracked in the S&P 500 Index roughly 
equal those of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom combined).  See generally Sarah E. Light, 
The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2019) (arguing that 
business law should be used as a lever of environmental law). 
 5.  The market capitalization of U.S. public companies is about $32 trillion.  See Market 
Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (United States), WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?locations=US&view=chart (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2019).  U.S. public companies employ about 30 million people, approximately twenty-six 
percent of the private sector workforce.  See Steven J. Davis et al., Volatility and Dispersion in 
Business Growth Rates: Publicly Traded Versus Privately Held Firms 37 tbl. 1 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper Series 12354, 2006), https://www.nber.org/papers/w12354.pdf.  
 6.  The view derives from the canonical article, Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305 (1976), which casts management as agents for the firm’s shareholders.  Id. at 308–09. 
 7.  See Rauterberg, supra note 1, at 914.  Sustainability theory is one modern incarnation of 
stakeholder theory.  See Lynne L. Dallas, Is There Hope for Change? The Evolution of Conceptions 
of “Good” Corporate Governance, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491, 553 (2017) (“[The] sustainability 
conception encourages firms to pursue long-term value and focus on the interests of their 
stakeholders.”). 
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Corporate-law scholars have spent at least ninety years debating these 
conflicting views of corporate purpose.8  This debate swirls today,9 but 
academics, practitioners, and policymakers alike have failed to notice that 
securities law—the complex system of federal regulations designed to protect 
investors—now has a far greater impact on corporate purpose than corporate 
law.  This Article will show that, though there is no legal mandate or intent 
to do so, the securities laws force public companies to conform to the 
shareholder primacy view of corporate purpose.10  Public companies are 
compelled, in fact, to follow a narrow version of this view, which measures 
shareholder welfare by stock price despite broad skepticism about this 
metric.11 
The mechanism for this de facto shareholder-primacy requirement is 
hedge-fund activism.12  Hedge funds—private and largely unregulated pools 
of investment capital—have traditionally made money for their investors 
through complex trading, hedging, and derivatives strategies.13  In recent 
years, though, some have adopted a much more aggressive approach.  
                                                          
 8.  Professor Adolf Berle and Professor Merrick Dodd famously debated the purpose of firms 
in the Harvard Law Review in the 1930s.  See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in 
Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (“It is the thesis of this essay that all powers granted to 
a corporation or to the management of a corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable 
only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.”); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (1932) 
(arguing that “corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders”); E. 
Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 
(1932) (arguing that the corporation “has a social service as well as a profit-making function”); see 
also A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited 
Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 36–39 (1991) (tracing the history of this debate). 
 9.  Compare Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems 
Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 586–96 (2018) (presenting a model for how to 
make management accountable to stakeholders), with Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: 
The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established 
by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 793 (2015) (opining 
that rather than encouraging firms to act in the interest of stakeholders, “if interests such as the 
environment, workers, and consumers are to be protected, then what is required is a revival of 
effective externality regulation that gives these interests more effective and timely protection”). 
 10.  See infra Part II. 
 11.  See infra Section II.E.  As I will note in Section I.C., the field of behavioral finance has led 
to a great deal of skepticism about the link between share price and long-term shareholder value, 
sometimes referred to as “fundamental value.”  See also Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 593 
n.70 (“By the close of the twentieth century . . . the idea that stock market prices always capture 
fundamental value had been largely abandoned by sophisticated commentators in the face of an 
enormous and growing empirical and theoretical literature demonstrating this often was not true.”).  
See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL 
FINANCE (2000). 
 12.  See infra Section II.F. 
 13.  See David Finstad, Have Institutional Investors Spoiled the Hedge Fund Party?, 
INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1bh5sbz82rzb 
x/Have-Institutional-Investors-Spoiled-the-Hedge-Fund-Party (describing how hedge funds 
creatively combine “equities, fixed income, commodities, derivatives, and private investments”). 
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Activist hedge funds dissect the copious disclosures required of public 
companies.  They then purchase stakes in target firms and demand that they 
make changes to immediately increase stock prices.  Targets overwhelmingly 
cooperate.  Moreover, because all firms are afraid of becoming targets, they 
preemptively take actions to maximize their trading value.  The fear of 
activist intervention creates a world of de facto shareholder primacy, where 
companies are overwhelmingly incentivized to maximize stock prices at the 
expense of all else.14 
Etsy’s experience illustrates how the securities laws, as leveraged by 
activists, transform the fundamental values of corporations.  The company 
provides a platform for artisans and small businesses to sell crafts and other 
(often quirky) goods to online customers.15  As a private firm, Etsy was 
idealistic and mission-driven.16  It was a certified B Corp, a status awarded 
only to companies that demonstrate a commitment to stakeholders.17  Etsy 
strove to be “a paragon of righteous business practices,” and its “founders 
believed its business model—helping mostly female entrepreneurs make a 
living online—was inherently just.”18 
When Etsy went public in April 2015,19 it unwittingly sacrificed these 
principles.  Etsy’s initial public offering was a success, but its stock price 
slumped within a couple of years.20  A hedge fund, Black-and-White Capital, 
saw the slide in stock price as an opportunity.21  The fund bought a slice of 
Etsy and immediately pushed for changes to reverse the decline.22  The fund 
forced the ouster of beloved CEO Chad Dickerson.23  New leadership then 
laid off nearly twenty-five percent of Etsy’s workforce24 and let the 
company’s B Corp certification lapse.25  The intervention was a victory for 
hedge-fund investors.  Etsy’s stock price increased twenty-seven percent in 
                                                          
 14.  See infra Section II.G. 
 15.  See ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2019). 
 16.  See David Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/business/etsy-josh-silverman.html. 
 17.  See id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Max Chafkin & Jing Cao, The Barbarians Are at Etsy’s Hand-Hewn, Responsibly Sourced 
Gates, BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-05-18/the-
barbarians-are-at-etsy-s-hand-hewn-responsibly-sourced-gates. 
 20.  See id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See id.  
 23.  Gelles, supra note 16. 
 24.  See Caroline O’Donovan, Some Etsy Employees Aren’t Happy About the Company’s More 
Corporate Direction, BUZZFEED (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/as-
etsys-new-leadership-celebrates-earnings-some-employees?utm_term=.iaWwyXdmwR#.xwp9jx6 
y9O. 
 25.  Gelles, supra note 16. 
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the months following the transition.26  But the company’s founding values 
are now gone. 
None of this would have happened without securities regulation.  As a 
public company, Etsy was for the first time required to disclose its operations 
and finances.  While Black-and-White Capital applied the decisive pressure, 
the transparency into Etsy’s business that resulted from its compliance with 
the securities laws is what provided the hedge fund with the necessary insight 
into the company to transform it from a stakeholder-oriented firm to one 
driven by stock prices.  Etsy’s conversion shows that only one corporate 
purpose can survive the public markets, where hedge funds dig through 
securities-law disclosures for hints about how to unearth profits for their 
investors. 
Activist hedge funds have transformed the securities laws into a 
powerful tool of shareholder primacy—and that has serious and unintended 
consequences.  It is anathema to both corporate and securities law to force 
companies to pursue this, or any, particular aim.  Instead, corporate law 
leaves corporate purpose to the firms themselves.27  Likewise, a foundational 
principle of securities law is noninterference with corporate operations.28  
Further still, the corporate-purpose rigidity contravenes principles of 
federalism and private ordering, and renders entrepreneurs less innovative, 
investors less diversified, and equity markets less stable.29  The response to 
all this is to halt hedge-fund activism. 
This Article will make three primary contributions to the literature.  
First, it will introduce and deeply explore the concept of de facto shareholder 
primacy.30  This will bring an entirely new dimension to the corporate-
purpose debate, which has so far been stuck in corporate law.  Second, 
viewing securities regulation through the lens of de facto shareholder 
primacy will provide a fresh way to analyze hedge-fund activism—the social-
welfare consequences of which is one of most hotly debated topics in law and 
finance.31  The new perspective will reveal that the current debate fails to 
                                                          
 26.  John Mannes, Etsy Lives to Fight Another Day as New Leadership Shaves Costs and 
Delivers an Earnings Beat, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 3, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/03/etsy-
lives-to-fight-another-day-as-new-leadership-shaves-costs-and-delivers-an-earnings-beat/. 
 27.  See infra Section I.E. 
 28.  See infra notes 288–290 and accompanying text. 
 29.  See infra Section II.I. 
 30.  See infra Part II. 
 31.  See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective 
on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 
1871 (2017) (“Few topics are sexier . . . now than whether activist hedge funds are good for, a 
danger to, or of no real consequence to public corporations and the people who depend upon them.”).  
As it stands, pillars of corporate and securities law stand on opposite sides of the controversy.  
Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1643 (2013) (arguing that hedge-fund activism provides useful management 
accountability), and Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: 
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appreciate how activism interacts with the securities laws.32  By situating the 
debate in its proper institutional context, this Article will for the first time 
show the full scope of the harms that activists cause.  Third, this Article will 
offer a simple way to eliminate activism that flows from this new, more 
complete, understanding.33 
The proposal, which the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
could implement without congressional involvement, is to reform one of 
securities regulations’ many disclosure rules.34  Currently, investors are 
required to report their holdings and material plans for the firm once they 
have acquired five percent of a target company’s shares.35  If investors were 
required to report acquisition and intervention plans before they buy any 
shares with the intent to influence corporate affairs, then activism would end.  
The reporting would lead to increased stock prices in anticipation of the 
intervention.36  Fully informed stock prices would deprive hedge funds of the 
ability to buy low from unsuspecting shareholders and sell high when the 
market adjusts to their presence.  The securities laws would recede from 
corporate purpose, giving firms the flexibility that is the hallmark of 
corporate law and, in turn, fostering innovation, adding opportunities for 
investors, and lending stability to markets. 
This Article will proceed in three Parts.  Part I briefly will overview the 
shareholder primacy and stakeholder theories of corporate purpose and show 
                                                          
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013) 
(arguing that hedge-fund activists are important “governance intermediaries”), with John C. Coffee, 
Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate 
Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 592–95 (2016) (arguing that hedge-fund activism raises a host of 
concerns and suggesting reform), and Strine, supra note 31, at 1873–74 (arguing that the interests 
of activist hedge funds do not align with long-term investors and suggesting reform).  One of the 
most influential and acerbic critics of hedge-fund activism is Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, 
Rosen & Katz.  See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; 
Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-
company-wreck-the-economy/ (“[A]ctivists are aided and abetted by Harvard Law School Professor 
Lucian Bebchuk who leads a cohort of academics who have embraced the concept of ‘shareholder 
democracy’ and close their eyes to the real-world effect of shareholder power, harnessed to activists 
seeking a quick profit, on a targeted company and the company’s employees and other 
stakeholders.”).  The debate is currently mired in dueling empirical studies that ultimately cannot 
answer the questions at the heart of the controversy.  For reviews of the extensive empirical 
literature, see generally Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS 
FIN. 185 (2009); Coffee & Palia, supra, at 581–92; Yvan Allaire & François Dauphin, “Activist” 
Hedge Funds: Creators of Lasting Wealth? What do the Empirical Studies Really Say? (July 16, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2460920. 
 32.  See infra Part III. 
 33.  See infra Section III.C. 
 34.  See infra Section III.C. 
 35.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l (2011); Form of Schedule 13D, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2014). 
 36.  Studies show that the gains from activism occur around when they announce their holdings 
and plans.  See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 551 & n.14. 
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that corporate law (with a focus on Delaware law) is agnostic.  Part II will 
show how the securities laws, because of the activities of activist hedge 
funds, impose de facto shareholder primacy.  It will also show that de facto 
shareholder primacy runs counter to principles of federalism and private 
ordering, and that these conflicts translate to real-world harms.  Part III will 
reconceptualize the hedge-fund activism debate around whether it is good 
public policy to allow hedge funds to use the securities laws to dictate 
corporate purpose.  This new framework will reveal a strong argument for 
curbing their influence.  This Part will end with a modest proposal to end 
hedge-fund activism and de facto shareholder primacy. 
I.  THEORIES OF THE FIRM AND CORPORATE PURPOSE 
The competing theories of corporate purpose are based on competing 
positive theories on the nature of the firm (i.e., theories about what firms are).  
Shareholder primacy theory is based on a “nexus-of-contracts” view37 and 
stakeholder theory is generally based on an “entity” view.38  These theories 
about what firms are translate into normative views about how they should 
act—the heart of the corporate-purpose debate.39 
A.  “Nexus of Contracts” and Shareholder Primacy 
The nexus-of-contracts view is the foundation of an elegant model of 
firm behavior and corporate purpose.  Professors Jensen and Meckling 
popularized this theory in their famous article, Theory of the Firm.40  
According to Jensen and Meckling’s theory, a firm “is a set of contracts 
among customers, suppliers, investors, managers, employees, and third-
parties . . . with the legal fiction of the corporation serving as the central node 
through which all of these contractual relationships are mediated.”41  This 
nexus of contracts “is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual 
claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization, which can generally 
be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals.”42 
These residual claimants are shareholders.  Because they own the 
residual, which is a variable claim dependent on how the firm is run, 
Professors Jensen and Meckling view management as the shareholders’ 
                                                          
 37.  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 311. 
 38.  See Joseph L. Bower & Lynn S. Paine, The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership, 
95 HARV. BUS. REV. 50, 57–59 (2017). 
 39.  This Section only scratches the surface of the corporate-purpose debate.  For more 
comprehensive treatments, see Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 586–96; Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440–49 (2001).  
 40.  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).  
 41.  Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 320 (1993).  
 42.  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 311. 
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agents, duty-bound to maximize their wealth.43  To the extent they fail to 
wholeheartedly devote themselves to this goal, management imposes 
“agency costs” on shareholders.44  The role of corporate law under this view 
of the firm is to police these agency costs.45  Implicit in all of this is a theory 
of corporate purpose and how the law relates to it: a corporation’s purpose is 
to serve shareholders, in particular, to maximize their wealth, and corporate 
law is there to police obedience to this purpose. 
What makes this account—the shareholder primacy view—particularly 
appealing is its link to the efficient market hypothesis (“EMH”).  Under 
EMH, stock prices reliably reflect the value of firm equity.46  Thus, 
management’s performance can be measured by a single, instantly 
accessible, figure—the firm’s stock price—a second-by-second appraisal of 
shareholder well-being.  Management is thus guided by a simple heuristic: 
maximize share price.47 
Professors Jensen and Meckling present their view of the firm as a 
positive theory, but like all positive theories, it carries normative 
implications.  In line with Professors Jensen and Meckling’s view, Milton 
Friedman famously argued that “the social responsibility of business is to 
increase its profits.”48  The logic behind this claim is that, since shareholders 
are residual claimants, and all other contractual counterparties to the firm 
have fixed claims, the way to maximize total value is to maximize the value 
of the residual.49 
The foregoing is the orthodox law-and-economics account of the firm—
it is a nexus of contracts overseen by the firm’s executives, who have a duty 
to maximize shareholder wealth as measured by share price.50 
Economists and legal scholars have hotly debated these ideas.  As a 
positive matter, critics raise a number of problems with this characterization 
of the firm.  Some of the most prominent critiques include the following: 
                                                          
 43.  Id.  
 44.  STOUT, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 45.  D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons from 
Kmart, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1059 (1996) (“Under the contractarian model, the purpose of the 
corporate governance system is the minimization of agency costs.”). 
 46.  See Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 201–02 (2010). 
 47.  See Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Story of Pinocchio: Now I’m a Real Boy, 45 B.C. L. REV. 
829, 848 (2004) (describing stock price as “the modern surrogate for shareholder primacy”).  
 48.  Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. 
 49.  Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 263 (1999). 
 50.  See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 39, at 447.  There is also a less strident version of 
this theory in which management has a duty only to shareholders, but their interests stretch beyond 
wealth maximization to things like clean air and fair employment practices.  See STOUT, supra note 
1, at 90.  This version turns shareholder primacy into a type of stakeholder theory, where broader 
shareholder values, in principle, dictate how the firm balances stakeholder interests. 
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Because firms can hold property, they are more than a mere contractual 
node;51 because shareholders lack the requisite control, the relationship 
between shareholders and management is not truly one of “agency” as 
defined by law;52 because shareholders have discordant interests, most 
notably between short- and long-term holders, the command to serve 
shareholders is incoherent;53 and because others are affected by the firm’s 
decisions, shareholders are not the only holders of variable claims.54  To flesh 
out the final argument, bondholders, for instance, have interests that in many 
ways conflict with those of shareholders.55  One example is that a firm might 
increase its debt load.  This action might improve shareholder returns, but it 
reduces the value of outstanding bonds.56  Thus, shareholder-friendly actions 
can constitute wealth transfers from other stakeholders. 
The positive critiques of the accuracy of Professor Jensen and 
Meckling’s model bleed into normative ones based on both efficiency and 
distributional (i.e., fairness) concerns.  Most importantly, if the shareholders 
are not the only ones impacted by management’s actions, then it does not 
follow that corporate leadership should act solely on their behalf.  In this case, 
the firm may generate more total value by balancing the competing claims, 
which would provide incentives for other stakeholders to make long-term 
investments in the firm’s success.57 
The distributional argument focuses on the externalities generated from 
a focus on shareholders.58  For instance, under a shareholder primacy view, 
a firm has the incentive to pollute the waterways of local communities if it 
would generate shareholder value.  This might be inefficient if the 
community’s needs are weighed in the cost-benefits equation.  But even if 
stockholders gain more than the community loses (a net benefit calculation 
consistent with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency59), one could reasonably argue that 
this distribution of resources—from those unfortunate enough to live 
                                                          
 51.  See Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 278. 
 52.  Id. at 290–91.  
 53.  See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 661 (2006). 
 54.  Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 
2014 (2013). 
 55.  See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1907, 1928 (2013) (“[I]t is now clear that increasing the alignment of managers and shareholders 
can have a significant effect on bondholders.”).  
 56.  Stout, supra note 54, at 2011. 
 57.  Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 315.  
 58.  Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 592. 
 59.  According to this measure, a change is efficient if total welfare is increased even if some 
parties’ share is reduced.  See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 49 (1996). 
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downstream from a polluter to those with money to invest in the offending 
enterprise—is unfair.60 
B.  “Entity” Theory and Stakeholder Theory 
Those who reject the nexus-of-contracts view and, among other things, 
its implications for corporate purpose, argue that the corporate entity is more 
than a contracting convenience.  Although there are many theories that seek 
to reify the firm, the one that is the best foil to the nexus-of-contracts—and 
in my view, has the most appeal—is sometimes referred to as entity theory.61  
According to this view, the firm is an artificial person and the owner of its 
own residual.62  “Equity,” after all, appears on the corporation’s balance 
sheet.  And the firm has discretion over what to do with it.  Most tellingly, 
the decision whether to pay out dividends from retained earnings (a portion 
of firm equity) belongs to management.  The shareholders lack any say over 
when and whether they receive distributions.  Under the entity view, the 
firm’s goal is not necessarily to maximize shareholder wealth.63  
Management may balance competing interests to the extent it deems fit—
acting on behalf of the entity within legal bounds.64 
Entity theory thus opens the door to stakeholders.65  Who constitutes a 
stakeholder is the subject of debate,66 but one commonly used (and broad) 
definition is that the term stakeholder encompasses “any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s 
objectives.”67  Under this definition, employees, consumers, suppliers, and 
owners are commonly listed, as well as an oblique reference to something 
like “broader society.”68 
These groups include those who make some investment in the firm, 
broadly construed.69  Shareholders invest money.  Employees invest human 
capital.  Members of society invest through taxes, which go to fund 
                                                          
 60.  See Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy, 30 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 587, 605–09 (1997). 
 61.  See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 586–87; Bower & Paine, supra note 38, at 60; 
Dodd, supra note 8, at 1146. 
 62.  Stout, supra note 54, at 2013. 
 63.  See Bower & Paine, supra note 38, at 60 (stating that the function of corporations under 
entity theory is to “[p]rovide goods and services; provide employment; create opportunities for 
investment; drive innovation”). 
 64.  See Dodd, supra note 8, at 1159–63. 
 65.  Not all who reject shareholder primacy, embrace entity theory.  See Blair & Stout, supra 
note 49, at 254 (arguing for a stakeholder-oriented model from a nexus-of-contracts perspective).  
 66.  See Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, The Ethical and Environmental Limits of Stakeholder 
Theory, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 215, 215 (2002). 
 67.  R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 
(2010). 
 68.  Orts & Strudler, supra note 66, at 218. 
 69. See id. 
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infrastructure on which corporations depend.  In addition, by granting 
corporations limited liability, society has made an implicit bargain with 
corporate shareholders.70  While this may benefit society on the whole, 
everyone bears a small cost for this exchange and has thereby made an 
investment in these enterprises.  Another way to picture stakeholders is in 
terms of externalities.71  For instance, those who live in a valley downwind 
of a company’s emissions are stakeholders because they are “affected by” the 
firm, namely the negative externalities of its actions. 
The normative arguments for stakeholder theory are the corollary to the 
efficiency and distributional critiques to shareholder primacy noted above.  
Briefly, it is argued that it would be more efficient to balance stakeholder 
interests because doing so would encourage stakeholder engagement, and 
firms with strong stakeholder support maximize total value over the long-
term.72  Moreover, it would be fairer to balance such interests because it 
would avoid the concentration of wealth in shareholders to the detriment of, 
for example, employees and community members.73  Consistent with these 
arguments, under the leading theory of business ethics, managers are 
encouraged to maximize a “triple bottom line”—profits, people, and planet.74 
Like shareholder primacy, stakeholder theory has endured decades of 
critique.  The most important revolves around accountability.  Critics argue 
that allowing managers to balance stakeholder interests in whatever manner 
they please is an invitation to abuse.  Accountability to everyone equates to 
accountability to no one.  The promised efficiency and fairness gains, 
therefore, may be overrated or even chimerical.75 
                                                          
 70.  See Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. & 
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 23 (2015). 
 71.  See James A. Stieb, Assessing Freeman’s Stakeholder Theory, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 401, 407 
(2009). 
 72.  Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 292; Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization and 
Stakeholder Theory, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (July 24, 2001), 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/value-maximization-and-stakeholder-theory (“[I]f we tell all participants 
in an organization that its sole purpose is to maximize value, we would not get maximum value for 
the organization.”). 
 73.  See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: 
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 80–81 (1995). 
 74.  See Triple Bottom Line, ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2009), 
https://www.economist.com/news/2009/11/17/triple-bottom-line; see also Rauterberg, supra note 
1, at 914 (“In business ethics, the leading view is that corporate managers should balance the 
interests of all the constituencies affected by a firm’s actions, including employees, suppliers, 
consumers, owners, and the broader society (‘stakeholder theory’).”). 
 75.  See Stephen Bainbridge, A Duty to Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-are-corporations-obligations-to-
shareholders/a-duty-to-shareholder-value.  For the stakeholder theory response, see KENT 
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE 
POSSIBILITIES 231–33 (2006); Dallas, supra note 7, at 559 (arguing that decisionmakers can be held 
accountable to multiple constituencies). 
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C.  Shareholder Primacy Reimagined—Long-Term Shareholder Value 
and Efficient Markets 
The idea that firms should pursue long-term shareholder value is a 
version of shareholder primacy that highlights the role of stakeholders in the 
calculus.76  Proponents of this view point out that shareholder primacy means 
a commitment to maximizing the fundamental value of the firm77 (i.e., the 
discounted present value of the shareholders’ future cash flows78).  The way 
to maximize this figure likely means looking out for the long-term prospects 
of the firm, which includes considering the interests of stakeholders.79  Over 
time, the most valuable firms are likely the ones that are good to their 
employees and the community.80 
While long-term wealth maximization may be the most influential 
version of shareholder primacy,81 largely because it has been endorsed by the 
Delaware courts,82 the introduction of this concept has done little to quell 
debate.  In putting shareholders first, it fails to convincingly address the 
efficiency and distributional critiques levied earlier.  It may not always be 
most efficient to prioritize shareholders in balancing competing stakeholder 
concerns (for instance, group welfare may be enhanced by privileging 
employee interests).83  With respect to fairness, shareholders may never 
                                                          
 76.  See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Short- and Long-Term Investors (and Other 
Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their Interests Conflict?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 396, 398 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds. 2016). 
 77.  See Cliff Asness, Shareholder Value Is Undervalued, AQR INSIGHTS (Jan. 6, 2015), 
https://www.aqr.com/Insights/Perspectives/Shareholder-Value-Is-Undervalued#_ftn2. 
 78.  See Jeff Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation, 39 J. 
CORP. L. 347, 363 (2014). 
 79.  See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991) (“[M]aximizing profits for equity investors assists the other 
‘constituencies’ automatically. . . . A successful firm provides jobs for workers and goods and 
services for consumers.  The more appealing the goods to consumers, the more profit (and jobs).  
Prosperity for stockholders, workers, and communities goes hand in glove with better products for 
consumers.”).  
 80.  See Asness, supra note 77 (opining that companies maximize shareholder value by “having 
some combination of great products, perhaps a mission that is truly beneficial to the world, satisfied 
customers or clients, and a team of employees that is motivated to deliver”); Belinfanti & Stout, 
supra note 9, at 619–20 (“[E]xecutives who publicly espouse shareholder value as their ultimate 
objective . . . still emphasize that the best way to achieve that objective is not to focus directly on 
trying to ‘maximize’ profits or share price, but instead to pay close attention to the company’s sales 
trends, employee morale, customer satisfaction, supply chain, and reinvestment initiatives.”). 
 81.  See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 589; Jensen, supra note 72; Strine, supra note 9, 
at 768. 
 82.  See infra Section I.E. 
 83.  See Bower & Paine, supra note 38, at 58 (“Agency theory’s implied decision rule—that 
managers should always maximize value for shareholders—oversimplifies this challenge and leads 
eventually to systematic underinvestment in other important relationships.”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad 
and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1198 (2002) 
(“[S]hareholder primacy easily can produce results that are inefficient . . . the ideal rule of corporate 
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internalize the cost to certain non-shareholders, like affected communities, 
especially if they are not local residents.84 
Moreover, whether the long-term shareholder value view is truly an 
innovation depends on the validity of EMH.  If stock prices are efficient, then 
this view is merely a restatement of the traditional law-and-economics 
version.  Since the price would reflect its long-term prospects, any gain would 
reveal an increase in the long-term value of the firm.85  Only in an inefficient 
market would share prices deviate from long-term value.  If this is the case, 
then long-term value theory has significantly different implications than the 
original—managers should maximize long-term value rather than current 
stock prices. 
Whether share prices reflect long-term or short-term value is 
particularly important.  The distinction not only determines whether the 
emphasis on long-term value is a unique strain of shareholder primacy.  As 
further discussed in Part II, whether share prices reflect long-term value is 
also essential to the debate about the consequences of hedge-fund activism.86  
There are a number of things that companies can do—and that hedge funds 
push—that have short-term benefits but long-term costs.  Squeezing more out 
of current employees might increase firm value in the short term, but in the 
long-term disaffected workers are likely to quit.  The cost of hiring and 
training new personnel then eats into future profits.  Cuts to research and 
development (“R&D”) save money now, but over time a company loses its 
competitive edge.  Companies can decrease the quality of their products to 
save costs.  But eventually customers will switch.  Professor Stout uses the 
imagery of fishing with dynamite.87  It might a produce a record catch, but 
the long-term welfare of the fishing company is destroyed.88 
In an efficient market, stock prices would accurately reflect the short-
term/long-term tradeoff.89  A company that starts making inferior goods 
would see a stock decline.  If stock prices can deviate significantly from long-
term value, however, then such moves could result in a stock-price bump.  
Despite the increase in stock prices, actions where short-term benefits are 
                                                          
governance, at least from an efficiency perspective, is to require corporate directors to maximize 
the sum of all the risk-adjusted returns enjoyed by all of the groups that participate in firms.”). 
 84.  See Strine, supra note 9, at 786–87 (arguing that “externality regulation is important, 
because the profit-pressure put on corporations by institutional investors is strong”). 
 85.  See Jonathan R. Macey, Market for Corporate Control, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY, 
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/MarketforCorporateControl.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) 
(“Share prices reflect the present value of future returns to shareholders and are, therefore, a measure 
of the long run.  Successful corporate strategies, even those that are not expected to produce positive 
returns for years, will generate immediate increases in share prices.”). 
 86.  See infra notes 221–235 and accompanying text. 
 87.  STOUT, supra note 1, at 51. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See Macey, supra note 85. 
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outweighed by future costs would be inconsistent with long-term value 
theory. 
Research in behavioral finance suggests that, despite long-term 
consequences, short-term actions can increase stock prices.  Prices that reflect 
future prospects are the result of efficient markets.  Efficiency requires 
arbitrage trading—informed buying and selling behavior that corrects 
mispricings.90  The central insight of behavioral finance is that arbitrage is 
inherently risky and expensive, and that stock prices deviate from 
fundamental value to the extent of these costs.91  The prediction of inaccurate 
stock prices is backed by a mountain of empirical evidence.92 
One particularly relevant reason why short-term moves can cause a 
deviation has to do with the structure of institutional investing.  For the short-
term and long-term to align, sophisticated institutions need to buy, sell, or 
short-sell stocks that are mispriced in the hopes that they will return to 
fundamental value in the future.  Estimating the fundamental value of a 
security in the long-term, though, is costly and uncertain.93  The future is 
inherently unknowable.  And stock prices only return to fundamental value 
if others in the market eventually agree with a prescient analyst’s assessment.  
But broader market awareness of a long-term mispricing may take a long 
time.  In a competitive institutional marketplace, where money managers are 
judged on short-term results, analysts may lose their jobs before their bet pays 
off.94 
Because of the inherent uncertainty of long-term valuation and the risk 
of investor flight before the market catches up, picking stocks based on 
fundamental value is generally a bad way to make money.  That being the 
case, few do it.  A recent study showed that eighty-five percent of analysts 
use metrics that are only loosely related to fundamental analysis to assess 
companies.95  The use of the price-earnings ratio, for example, is common.96  
Valuation is based simply on comparing this figure to other like companies.  
                                                          
 90.  Technically, a stock’s price reflects the value at which parties are willing to transact.  An 
adjustment to the expectations about the value of a particular stock, therefore, is sufficient to change 
its price.  The gains from arbitrage trading, however, are what drive parties to adjust their 
expectations. 
 91.  Schwartz, supra note 46, at 204–21. 
 92.  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 291 (2014) (“‘Overwhelming 
empirical evidence’ now suggests that even when markets do incorporate public information, they 
often fail to do so accurately.” (quoting Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 
10b–5 Damages: A Legal, Economic and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 20–21 (1994))); 
Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 593 n.70. 
 93.  See Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession, 61 FIN. 
ANALYST J. 65, 65 (2005). 
 94.  See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think 
Long Term, 66 BUS. L. 1, 12 (2010). 
 95.  See Rappaport, supra note 93, at 68 n.8. 
 96.  See id. at 68. 
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There is no calculation of discounted cash flows.  If much of the smart money 
is ignoring long-term valuation, then there is a significant chance that today’s 
prices are far off from the correct value.97 
In light of the behavioral finance critique of efficient markets, the most 
plausible view is that share prices largely reflect short-term valuations with 
some anchor to fundamental value.  If the distance between short-term values 
and real value becomes too far off, this opens up an arbitrage opportunity 
despite the costs and risks.  But the distance is unknown and potentially 
wide.98  This means that steps that improve the short-term prospects of a 
company, even if they reduce its long-term value, have the potential to 
increase stock prices—even over an extended period. 
The challenges to market efficiency mean that long-term value theory is 
more than a restatement of the orthodox approach, where share price equates 
to value.  In fact, in light of these challenges, defenders of the orthodox 
approach must either fall back to long-term value theory or argue that 
managers should still maximize stock prices even though the link to 
fundamental value is unknown (and unknowable).  The former runs into 
accountability problems similar to those faced by stakeholder theory.99  
Almost any action can be framed as in the interests of long-term value, and 
stock prices are an unreliable lodestar.100 
The latter view that managers should maximize stock prices regardless 
of their accuracy could be defended on the grounds that maximizing stock 
prices literally maximizes shareholder value.  But this stance is normatively 
problematic.  It amounts to an instruction to management to sacrifice the 
future in favor of the present if it means a higher stock price.  Acting like this, 
however, destabilizes markets and hinders innovation.101  It is a path to 
nowhere.  In a search of the literature, I could not find anyone who endorsed 
the view that short-termism regardless of future consequences was a 
promising corporate purpose.  As argued in Part II, however, this warped 
view of shareholder primacy is the one that the securities laws force on public 
firms. 
                                                          
 97.  See id. 
 98.  See William W. Bratton, Supersize Pay, Incentive Compensation, and the Volatile 
Shareholder Interest in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 150, 159 (F. Scott Kieff & 
Troy A. Paredes eds. 2010) (“Under the present consensus view, the stock market is a place where 
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 99.  See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 585. 
 100.  See id. at 598. 
 101.  See infra Section I.E. 
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D.  An Unsettled Debate 
Over time, managers have embraced disparate views of corporate 
purpose.  In the United States, waves of shareholder primacy thinking and 
stakeholderism rise and fall.102  After World War II until the 1970s, managers 
saw themselves as stewards for the firm and its constituents.103  The 1980s 
saw the rise of shareholder primacy.104  And these swings do not necessarily 
align with attitudes in other countries.  Continental Europe, for instance, is 
known for a stakeholder orientation.105  The variation means that there is no 
intrinsic “corporate purpose”; rather notions of corporate purpose are driven 
by norms and law. 
What the norms or laws should be is also uncertain.  From an efficiency 
perspective, the question is which corporate purpose maximizes social 
welfare.  It might maximize welfare for management to favor long-term 
shareholder interests, let contractual counterparties fend for themselves, and 
lean on regulators to address negative externalities.106  On the other hand, this 
may put too much faith in private ordering and regulatory capacity.  The 
result might be stakeholder underinvestment and diffuse economic, social, 
and environmental harms.  From a fairness perspective, the question is which 
corporate purpose leads to a more equitable distribution of resources.  Again, 
there are two plausible outcomes.  It may be better for management to have 
a single-minded shareholder focus and for society to handle distributional 
questions through tax policy or other social interventions.107  It could also be 
the case, however, that social redistribution and other programs are too blunt, 
and that management is better situated to decide how to equitably handle 
competing interests related to the business.108  And there would still be room 
for broader social redistribution to address imbalances. 
Since there are no clear answers, this may be something that is best left 
to entrepreneurs to decide for themselves.109  If corporate purpose is left to 
private ordering, each corporation could choose what to maximize and how 
to split the surplus it creates among its constituents.  Ultimately, while there 
                                                          
 102.  See Dallas, supra note 7, at 497–530; Rock, supra note 55, at 1912–13. 
 103.  Dallas, supra note 7, at 506–07. 
 104.  See id. at 508. 
 105.  A New Idolatry, ECONOMIST (Apr. 22, 2010), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2010/04/22/a-new-idolatry; Dallas, supra note 7, at 558. 
 106.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 579 (2003); Rock, supra note 55, at 1930; Strine, supra note 
9, at 792–93. 
 107.  See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial 
Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2070 (2001). 
 108.  See Robert A. Phillips & Joel Reichart, The Environment as Stakeholder? A Fairness-
Based Approach, 23 J. BUS. ETHICS 185, 187 (2000) (explaining that “the managerial challenge is 
to find a middle ground between the interests of the legitimate stakeholders”). 
 109.  See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 79, at 36. 
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has been a long-standing and heated debate about corporate purpose, 
corporate law takes this final approach. 
E.  Corporate Law and Theories of Corporate Purpose 
State corporate law governs the internal affairs of corporations.110  It 
sets out the default organizational structure of firms and the fiduciary duties 
of management.111  Entrepreneurs choose in which state to incorporate partly 
based on these rules, and Delaware is far and away the most popular.112  The 
default rule in Delaware requires that management adhere to the long-term 
value theory of shareholder primacy; it also gives shareholders legal and 
voting rights that theoretically allow them to police conformity.  Despite this 
framework, however, management has a great deal of discretion to run firms 
as they please.  Delaware corporations can easily opt out of the default 
structure; other states provide additional flexibility.  The result is a cafeteria-
style menu of corporate-purpose options for private companies.113 
Delaware law clearly does not mandate a particular purpose.  A 
company’s Certificate of Incorporation can specify that the corporation takes 
stakeholder interests into account.114  Whether the law imposes shareholder 
primacy as the default has long been debated, but the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark115 seems to 
put any doubts to rest.  In the case, the founders of Craigslist said that they 
were more interested in serving the community that made use of its online 
marketplace than in generating shareholder value.116  The court disapproved: 
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors 
are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany 
that form.  Those standards include acting to promote the value of 
the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders. . . . Thus, I 
cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that specifically, 
clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value 
of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders . . . .117 
                                                          
 110.  See Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs 
Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29, 32 (1987). 
 111.  See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 79, at 15, 90–91. 
 112.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J. 
L. & ECON. 383, 391 tbl.2 (2003) (stating 57.75% of firms incorporate in Delaware; California, the 
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 113.  Because entrepreneurs have such a range of options, it is plausible to assume that, in many 
cases, the choice to incorporate as a for-profit Delaware corporation amounts to an acceptance of 
the long-term value theory of shareholder primacy.  This does not, however, amount to an 
acceptance of de facto shareholder primacy, which equates good management with stock value. 
 114.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2018). 
 115.  eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 116.  See id. at 8. 
 117.  Id. at 34. 
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Though the language seems fairly straightforward and strict, Delaware 
law is not as demanding as it first appears.  Delaware judges have repeatedly 
emphasized their commitment to “long-term shareholder value.”118  And any 
stakeholder-oriented action can be defended on such grounds.119  Let us say 
management would like to give employees a raise.  Shareholders might 
rightfully complain that this money comes out of their pockets, but 
management can respond that the added compensation is important for 
employee retention.  Since almost any decision can be similarly justified, the 
command to privilege shareholders is all-but toothless. 
This is particularly true given the legal standard that is applied to such 
challenges.  The law affords extraordinary deference to management under 
the business judgment rule—the legal standard for adjudicating allegations 
of unintentional mismanagement.120  If management provides any plausible 
shareholder-related defense of its actions, it will withstand scrutiny.121  
Justice Strine, the then-Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, 
conceded the point in an otherwise fiery article excoriating those who 
question Delaware law’s commitment to shareholder primacy: 
 Of course, it is true that the business judgment rule provides 
directors with wide discretion, and thus enables directors to 
justify—by reference to long-run stockholder interests—a number 
of decisions that may in fact be motivated more by a concern for a 
charity the CEO cares about, the community in which the corporate 
headquarters is located, or once in a while, even the company’s 
ordinary workers, rather than long-run stockholder wealth.  But 
that does not alter the reality of what the law is . . . . [I]f a fiduciary 
admits that he is treating an interest other than stockholder wealth 
as an end in itself, rather than an instrument to stockholder wealth, 
he is committing a breach of fiduciary duty.122 
The key word in that lengthy quote is that shareholder primacy only 
applies if management admits favoritism toward other stakeholders.  Thus, 
so long as management defends its conduct through empty statements about 
shareholder value, its decisions are protected.123  This leaves little of the 
corporate-law obligation to pursue shareholder primacy. 
Although shareholders could turn to their voting rights to police 
management’s conformity to long-term value maximization, this avenue is 
                                                          
 118.  See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 9, at 595–96 (emphasis omitted).  
 119.  See STOUT, supra note 1, at 32. 
 120.  See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 121.  See Strine, supra note 9, at 776–77. 
 122.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 123.  According to Justice Strine, “My point, however, is not whether the law permits directors 
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n.84. 
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also of limited practical value.124  In theory, if shareholders think that board 
members are favoring other interests, they could vote them out of office.  
Officers would soon follow.  But the prospects for such upheaval are thin, at 
least for private companies.125  Since there are no explicit disclosure 
obligations under corporate law, shareholders lack the information to take 
such actions.126 
The only sources of disclosure are the duties of care and loyalty, which 
mandate informed shareholder consent for fundamental changes or to cure 
conflicts of interest, or when a director is selling to a shareholder while 
“possessed of special knowledge of future plans or secret resources and 
deliberately misleads a stockholder who is ignorant of them.”127  The 
Delaware corporate code also allows shareholders to demand information 
under section 220.128  Shareholders must justify any demand by reference to 
a “proper purpose.”129  The bar is generally low for this request, and can be 
satisfied by a claim that a shareholder wishes to value her shares.130  While 
this right is undoubtedly of some use, managers often resist and can hold up 
requests in litigation.131  The information is also confidential and cannot be 
shared with other shareholders.132  While section 220 may provide a 
shareholder with information on which to base a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim or sell shares, the inability to spread the information renders it 
unsuitable for launching a largescale campaign to unseat management. 
In the end, because the law supports only long-term shareholder value 
theory, because conformity is measured by the lax business judgment rule, 
and because shareholders lack the information to make meaningful use of 
their voting rights, the legal commitment to shareholder primacy is of limited 
real-world import.  While the law creates, or at the very least reinforces, the 
                                                          
 124.  See Bainbridge, supra note 106, at 569. 
 125.  Although shareholders could negotiate for more powerful information rights and voting 
power in the private sphere, the default structure leaves them ill-positioned to challenge 
management.  See id. at 569–72. 
 126.  See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: 
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 867 (2003) (noting that corporate law imposes 
few disclosure obligations). 
 127.  Lank v. Steiner, 224 A.2d 242, 244 (Del. 1966). 
 128.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2018). 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  See La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., No. 5682-VCL, 2011 
WL 773316, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011). 
 131.  See Rolfe Winkler, Startup Employees Invoke Obscure Law to Open up Books, WALL ST. 
J. (May 24, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/startup-employees-invoke-obscure-law-to-open-
up-books-1464082202. 
 132.  Confidentiality is frequently imposed by the Delaware courts.  See, e.g., Disney v. Walt 
Disney Co., 857 A.2d 444, 448 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“[I]t is often the case that the Court of Chancery 
will condition its judgment in Section 220 cases on the entry of a reasonable confidentiality order 
‘to prevent the dissemination of confidential business information to “curiosity seekers.”’”). 
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shareholder primacy norm, a legal obligation that can be so easily abjured is 
rather weak.133 
And entrepreneurs can completely opt out if they wish.  Entrepreneurs 
can choose to form Delaware benefit corporations (an option created by the 
Delaware legislature in August 2013).134  Such public benefit corporations 
promise to balance stakeholder interests.135  Thus, just within Delaware, there 
are a range of corporate-purpose options.  If founders find none of these 
setups appealing, they can opt to incorporate in a different state, with still 
other choices, including constituency statutes.  Under these statutes, 
corporations explicitly have the right to take stakeholder interests into 
account.136  Despite a longstanding and thoughtful debate about corporate 
purpose in Delaware law, all states, including Delaware, leave the decision 
to private ordering. 
The result is that entrepreneurs, and the private companies they found, 
can largely do as they please with respect to corporate purpose.  This 
approach makes sense in light of the uncertainty in the corporate-purpose 
debate.137  But once a company goes public, everything changes.  In imposing 
de facto shareholder primacy, the securities laws undermine this longstanding 
framework.  For public companies, the flexibility and discretion afforded 
under corporate law disappears. 
II.  DE FACTO SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 
Despite impassioned debate about the corporate-purpose demands of 
Delaware law, the legal structure is ultimately deferential.  Securities law is 
the opposite.  The rules say nothing about corporate purpose, and nobody 
talks about it.  But in practice, as a consequence of hedge-fund activism, the 
rules today effectively require conformity to the shareholder primacy norm.  
This Section traces how this happened.  The potential for de facto shareholder 
primacy is embedded in the structure of the securities laws, but it laid 
dormant until shifting securities markets gave rise to hedge-fund activism. 
                                                          
 133.  This account overlaps with a description of corporate law called “director primacy.”  
Bainbridge, supra note 106, at 550.  According to this view, the directors run corporations.  Id.  In 
that role, they are obligated to serve shareholders.  See id.  Shareholders, however, have little ability 
to police whether directors do so.  See id. at 569.  This Article, parts ways with director primacy in 
a number of respects.  Most importantly, director primacy claims to describe the governance of 
public corporations; this Article argues that, in this context, shareholders are now in control. 
 134.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (Supp. 2018). 
 135.  Id. § 365(a) (“The board of directors shall manage or direct the business and affairs of the 
public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the 
best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public 
benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.”). 
 136.  Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 16 (1992); see, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 717(b) (McKinney 1989). 
 137.  See supra Section I.D. 
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A.  The Basic Structure of Securities Regulation 
The securities laws are famously intricate, but the overarching structure 
is straightforward.  The centerpiece is disclosure, which is required of all 
public companies.138  When companies go public, they register with the SEC, 
which involves filing a registration statement, consisting mainly of a sales 
document (the “prospectus”) that typically stretches for hundreds of pages.139  
Once the SEC approves the registration statement, the company can sell 
shares to the public, and it becomes subject to periodic reporting 
obligations.140  These obligations include filing quarterly and annual reports, 
as well as brief disclosures when specified material events warrant.141  The 
centerpiece of securities-law disclosures, both in the prospectus and later 
filings, are financial statements142 and management’s discussion thereof (so-
called “MD&A”).143 
Public companies must also have policies and procedures in place to 
mitigate the risk of misstatements in these documents (so-called “internal 
controls”).144  The internal controls that relate to financial reporting must be 
audited by an independent accounting firm.145 
Rules also touch directly on corporate governance and shareholder 
rights.  Federal law mandates that companies have independent audit 
committees.146  The New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and Nasdaq 
listing requirements require that public companies have majority independent 
boards, and that they have wholly independent compensation and nominating 
committees.147  While the listing requirements are technically part of stock 
market rules, they are functionally part of securities regulation.148 
Shareholder voting is federally regulated through the proxy rules.149  
These require that public companies provide shareholders with disclosures to 
inform their voting with respect to board membership and any other matters 
                                                          
 138.  Schwartz, supra note 46, at 181. 
 139.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.404 (2019). 
 140.  See id. § 240.13a-13, 240.15d-1. 
 141.  See id. § 240.13a-13. 
 142.  See id. § 210.3-01 to 210.3-20. 
 143.  See id. § 229.303. 
 144.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 229.308. 
 145.  17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01. 
 146.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1. 
 147.  See NASDAQ, THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET LLC RULES 5605 (2020), 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/Main/; NYSE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 
§ 303A.01, 303A.04–303A.07, https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-company-manual. 
 148.  See Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L. 
& BUS. REV. 10, 37 (2006) (“[T]he available evidence indicates that the organized exchanges do 
not even act as stand-alone regulators anymore.  Instead, they are better understood as conduits for 
the SEC . . . .”).  
 149.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2. 
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upon which their consent is sought.150  In addition, these rules dictate 
procedures that parties must follow when soliciting shareholder votes151 and 
that public companies must include shareholder proposals in the companies’ 
proxy-solicitation materials, provided certain conditions are met.152  Beyond 
all of this, public companies must now also provide shareholders with a “say-
on-pay”—an advisory vote on executive compensation.153 
Going public, however, is the exception.  Firms can stay private in a 
number of ways, most importantly by selling shares only to financially 
sophisticated individuals or institutions.154  Sophistication is almost always 
determined by a financial proxy—the accredited investor standard, which 
essentially deems parties sophisticated if they meet certain wealth or income 
thresholds.155 
Regardless of whether a company is public or private, its behavior is 
subject to securities-fraud regulations.156  Liability attaches to material 
misstatements made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.157  
The SEC, the Justice Department, and private parties can bring suit.158  If 
filings are false or misleading, a public company may be found liable for 
securities fraud even if the corporation or its management was not actively 
trading.159  Insider trading (i.e., trading while in possession “of material 
nonpublic information”) is also a considered a form of securities fraud.160 
The securities laws thus consist of a blanket anti-fraud prohibition that 
applies to all companies, and significant disclosure and operational 
requirements for firms that go public.  The well-accepted overarching 
justification for securities regulation is “investor protection.”161  Though the 
public disclosures were designed to enable investors to make informed 
purchase and sale decisions, few believe that individual investors actually 
read them.162  Rather, the current theory is that information contained in the 
disclosures is baked into stock prices.163  This is because sophisticated 
investors, analysts and the financial press read them; informed traders buy, 
                                                          
 150.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78n. 
 151.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3. 
 152.  See id. § 240.14a-8. 
 153.  See id. § 240.14a-21. 
 154.  See, e.g., id. § 230.506. 
 155.  See id. § 230.501. 
 156.  Id. § 240.10b-5. 
 157.  See id. 
 158.  Veronica M. Dougherty, A [Dis]semblance of Privity: Criticizing the Contemporaneous 
Trader Requirement in Insider Trading, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83, 85 (1999). 
 159.  Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 1908 
(2013). 
 160.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a). 
 161.  See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 181. 
 162.  Id. at 183. 
 163.  Id. at 184. 
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sell, or adjust their reservation prices based on their analyses; and prices 
adjust in reaction.164 
B.  Securities Law’s Expansive Potential 
The securities laws always contained the seeds of de facto shareholder 
primacy.  While the primary aim of the securities laws may be investor 
protection, the primary contribution is broader—comprehensive and credible 
information about public companies that is available to everyone.  Once in 
the public domain, the potential uses of the disclosures are limitless.  
Investors can use the information to help decide whether to purchase or sell 
securities, but anyone can use what they read for anything. 
Central to this Article is that credible comprehensive disclosures allow 
shareholders to police whether managers are looking out for shareholder 
interests.  Most important are the financial statements.  While they provide 
the information on earnings, growth, and risk that is essential for financial 
analysis of a potential investment, these same three metrics are also important 
to shareholders.  If earnings or growth appear stalled, shareholders can put 
pressure on managers to change how they operate.  In theory, shareholders 
could even wage a proxy contest if management’s response is unsatisfying.  
This potential to use securities disclosures for monitoring corporate 
executives is an intrinsic part of the regulations. 
Until recently, however, shareholders did not use the transparency 
afforded to them to intervene in firm affairs.  A number of barriers stood in 
the way.  These have all eroded, however, and while retail investors (i.e., 
nonprofessional individual investors) are still essentially powerless, hedge 
funds now leverage the securities laws to police management and promote 
their agenda. 
C.  The Shifting Equity Market Landscape 
The changes to equity markets that set the stage for hedge-fund activism 
and de facto shareholder primacy took place in the last few decades.  The 
most important shift has been from retail to institutional shareholders.165 
Retail investors lack the time and skill to parse securities disclosures 
and intervene in firm affairs.  And they have little incentive to do so.  Even 
with the tools the securities laws provide, shareholders face a tremendous 
collective action problem.  They bear all of the costs of monitoring 
management and effecting change but share the benefits with other 
                                                          
 164.  See id. at 181–86; Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 117–18 (1999).  
 165.  See Brian G. Cartwright, General Counsel, U.S. SEC, The Future of Securities Regulation 
(Oct. 24, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm (describing the 
growth in institutional ownership and its implications). 
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shareholders and perhaps even other stakeholders.  It is, therefore, rational to 
stay out of firm governance and sell if prospects look bleak.166  The idea that 
shareholders are rationally apathetic with respect to voting in public 
companies dominated thinking in this area for almost a century.167  The ease 
of selling juxtaposed against the cost and difficulty of intervention168 meant 
that securities disclosures were tools for investing rather than tools of 
management oversight. 
The calculus, however, has changed.  At the inception of the securities 
laws, equities were almost universally owned by retail investors.169  While 
their ownership share has declined precipitously over time,170—the paradigm 
shift came with the rise of mutual funds in the 1980s and 1990s.171  These 
funds pool money from individuals and invest it in different types of 
securities, mainly stocks and bonds.  Their assets now total nearly $20 
trillion.172  They, along with other institutions, now dominate the stock 
market, owning more than seventy percent of public-company shares.173  And 
this figure understates the extent to which mutual funds and other institutions 
have come to dominate.  They do almost all of the public-market trading.174  
Moreover, individuals are less likely to vote their shares in director elections: 
In 2019, individuals voted twenty-eight percent of their shares while 
institutions voted ninety.175  Thus, both trading and voting activity is heavily 
institutional. 
Even as they amassed large holdings, institutions tended to stay out of 
firm affairs.  The response to poor management was to sell.176  But a series 
of developments has disrupted their passivity, making them a receptive 
audience for hedge funds seeking support for their activist campaigns. 
Department of Labor (“DOL”) and SEC rule changes in the last few 
decades pushed for increased institutional involvement.  In the 1980s, the 
                                                          
 166.  See Bainbridge, supra note 106, at 558. 
 167.  See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 47–65 (rev. ed. 1940) (providing the canonical work on oversight problems in 
public firms caused by dispersed ownership). 
 168.  See Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential 
Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 623 tbl.7A (2013) (estimating the cost of a proxy contest 
waged by a hedge-fund activist to be $10.8 million). 
 169.  See Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 391, 401 (2009). 
 170.  See id. at 402 fig.1. 
 171.  See Cartwright, supra note 165. 
 172.  See INV. CO. INST., 2018 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 58 (58th ed. 2018). 
 173.  Zingales, supra note 169, at 392; see also JAMES R. COPLAND & MARGARET M. O’KEEFE, 
PROXY MONITOR 2017: SEASON REVIEW (2017), 
http://www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/pmr_15.aspx (noting the influence of large institutional 
investors on the success of shareholder proposals in 2017). 
 174.  Zingales, supra note 169, at 392. 
 175.  PROXY PULSE, 2019 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 5 (2019), 
https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-proxypulse-2019-review.pdf. 
 176.  Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 553. 
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DOL explicitly stated that responsible proxy voting was part of a pension-
fund manager’s fiduciary obligations.177  In 2003, the SEC changed its rules 
to “require advisers to adopt and implement policies and procedures for 
voting proxies in the best interest of clients, to describe the procedures to 
clients, and to tell clients how they may obtain information about how the 
adviser has actually voted their proxies.”178 
The changes caused institutions to start paying attention to proxy voting.  
They also fueled the rise of proxy advisory firms, which allow for partial 
outsourcing of oversight responsibilities and an associated cost savings.179  
Through the use of proxy advisory services, mutual funds can participate in 
corporate governance, and meet their legal obligations, without a significant 
financial drain.180 
There have also been major shifts within the mutual-fund industry.  
Index fund investing has boomed in recent years.181  Unlike active fund 
managers, index funds cannot sell whenever they please.  Because they are 
required to track a particular index, the only way to improve returns is to take 
an active role.182 
The industry has also become more concentrated.  On average, forty-
five percent of an S&P 500 company’s stock is held by its ten largest 
institutional investors.183  Taken together, three mutual-fund complexes—
Vanguard, State Street, and BlackRock—are the largest shareholder in ninety 
percent of S&P 500 firms.184 
                                                          
 177.  The statement first came in an interpretive letter.  See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, 
Deputy Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon 
Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), reprinted in Pens. Rpt. (BNA) Vol. 15, No. 9 at 391 (Feb 29, 1988).  
The obligation is now codified as 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2016).  
 178.  Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6586 (Feb. 7, 2003).   
 179.  See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 557. 
 180.  See id. at 557–59; see also James R. Copland et al., The Big Thumb on the Scale: An 
Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry 2 (May 30, 2018) (unpublished Research Paper No. 18-
27, Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus.), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3188174 (providing an overview of the proxy 
advisory industry). 
 181.  See Trevor Hunnicutt, Index Funds to Surpass Active Fund Assets in U.S. by 2024: 
Moody’s, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-passive/index-funds-
to-surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-s-by-2024-moodys-idUSKBN15H1PN; Ryan Vlastelica, 
Passive Funds Aren’t Afraid to Throw Their Weight Around as Activists, MARKETWATCH (May 1, 
2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/passive-funds-arent-afraid-to-throw-their-weight-
around-as-activists-2017-05-01.  
 182.  See Jill Fisch et al., The New Titans of Wallstreet: A Theoretical Framework for Passive 
Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2020). 
 183.  David Benoit & Kirsten Grind, Activist Investors’ Secret Ally: Big Mutual Funds, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-secret-ally-big-mutual-funds-
1439173910. 
 184.  See Jan Fichtner et al., These Three Firms Own Corporate America, The CONVERSATION 
(May 10, 2017), http://theconversation.com/these-three-firms-own-corporate-america-77072.  
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These mutual-fund complexes are not activists.  But hedge-fund 
activism would be impossible without their concentrated ownership and 
engagement.185  An activist’s threat is only credible if there is widespread 
shareholder support.  It would be extraordinarily costly and likely fruitless to 
lobby millions of uninformed retail investors, but it is cheap and productive 
to make the case to a limited group of sophisticated institutions that have a 
legal obligation to listen. 
Institutions also aided activists through their involvement in the 
shareholder proposal process.  They backed, and in some cases pushed for, 
changes that have shifted power to shareholders.  Shareholder proposals tend 
to cluster into three categories: corporate governance reforms that increase 
shareholder power, executive compensation, and social policy.186  While 
shareholder proposals can be made by shareholders with only minimal 
holdings187—and in fact are commonly made by individuals (so-called 
“gadflies”)188—it is institutional support that gives them teeth.  Their votes 
ultimately determine what gets implemented.  While proposals with little 
support have little influence, those with majority support frequently become 
company policy.189 
The institutional vote has tended to back shareholder-empowering 
proposals and those that address executive compensation, while rejecting 
proposals with a social aim.190  The support for shareholder-friendly 
proposals has led to a spate of corporate governance changes, such as proxy 
access, declassified boards, simple majority voting, and separation of the 
CEO and Chairman-of-the-Board positions.191  Without getting into detail, 
these changes loosen management’s control over boards and foster 
shareholder involvement in director nomination and selection.  Although this 
was not what institutions had in mind in lending their support, the shift in the 
balance of power toward shareholders eased the path for activism, a hallmark 
of which is confrontation with incumbent boards. 
Finally, as the barriers to activism declined, the hedge-fund industry has 
also matured.  In the 1980s and 1990s hedge funds prospered with novel 
                                                          
 185.  Gilson & Gordon, supra note 31, at 863, 886; Strine, supra note 31, at 1898–99 (“Without 
the support of . . . mainstream funds, the activist hedge fund leader would not have the clout to 
extract favorable concessions in a settlement, much less to prevail in a contested proxy fight.”). 
 186.  See COPLAND & O’KEEFE, supra note 173, at 5–6. 
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 189.  See Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The Role of Shareholder Proposals in Corporate 
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arbitrage strategies.192  But the low-hanging fruit has been picked and the 
fund marketplace has become crowded.193  With more pliable boards and 
concentrated ownership, active engagement with companies became a newly 
promising way to make money for their investors. 
D.  The Strategy of Hedge-Fund Activists 
Against this backdrop, activist hedge funds have proliferated.  Their 
strategy is straightforward.  The funds first research companies and select 
their target.194  They then purchase a portion of the company’s stock, 
typically around six to eight percent.195  Funds also join together in so-called 
“wolf packs.”  In this case, a group of funds invest in a target before the lead 
fund’s intervention is publicly disclosed.196  Next, hedge funds pressure 
management for change and lobby institutional investors to support their 
position.197  If management does not immediately concede, the fund publicly 
criticizes firm leadership, and if that does not work, they wage a proxy contest 
to gain board seats and push their agenda.198 
Institutional investors frequently support activist campaigns.  While 
they do not always get along, proxy advisory firms and mutual funds have 
shown themselves often to be receptive to the activists’ proposals.199  There 
                                                          
 192.  See David Finstad, Have Institutional Investors Spoiled the Hedge Fund Party, 
INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Oct. 21, 2018), 
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1bh5sbz82rzbx/Have-Institutional-Investors-
Spoiled-the-Hedge-Fund-Party. 
 193.  See id. 
 194.  See Damien J. Park, Activist Investors and Target Identification, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 23, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/23/activist-investors-and-target-identification/; Bill 
George & Jay W. Lorsch, How to Outsmart Activist Investors, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2014), 
https://hbr.org/2014/05/how-to-outsmart-activist-investors. 
 195.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: 
Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5 (2013) (finding a median ownership interest of 6.3%); 
C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: 
The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 300 (2016) (finding 
median ownership of 8.3%). 
 196.  Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/26/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-and-other-activist-
investors/. 
 197.  Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
561, 583 (2006); Yvan Allaire, Hedge Fund Activism: Preliminary Results and Some New Empirical 
Evidence, INST. FOR GOVERNANCE OF PRIV. & PUB. ORGANIZATIONS 17 (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20150401_Allaire.pdf 
 198.  Anabtawi, supra note 197, at 583.  
 199.  Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 568 (“Although [proxy adviser] recommendations do not 
invariably favor the insurgents, they do support the insurgents much of the time.”); Assaf Hamdani 
& Sharon Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U. L. REV. 971, 978–79 (2019); Strine, 
supra note 31, at 1898 (describing mutual-fund support of activists); Allaire, supra note 197, at 42 
(describing “strong support” from institutional investors). 
 
680 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:652 
is also anecdotal evidence that mutual funds nudge activists towards certain 
engagements.200 
Activist interventions fall into roughly four categories.  The first 
involves challenges to the governance of the target firm.  They might seek to 
change the structure of corporate governance or the makeup of 
management.201  For example, funds might push to increase board 
independence or remove the CEO.202  The second involves demands to 
distribute corporate cash to shareholders.  Along these lines, funds will 
commonly demand dividend payments or stock buy-backs (even if 
companies must borrow to raise the necessary funds).203  Third, activists call 
for corporate reorganizations.  They argue that the target should be sold204 or 
that it should spin-off a division or substantial assets.205  Finally, activists 
look for ways to reduce costs.  They might advocate cuts to executive 
compensation,206 R&D, or staff.207  Hedge funds have also pushed for ways 
to reduce the targets’ taxes, including inversions.208 
Companies initially resist,209 but they frequently concede to activist 
demands.  In the great majority of cases they enact the activist’s agenda in 
whole or in part.210  Usually companies accede as part of a privately 
negotiated settlement in which hedge funds also receive board seats.211  If 
companies are unwilling to settle, and a proxy contest ensues, hedge funds 
win sixty percent of the time.212 
                                                          
 200. See Che Odom, Long-Term Investors Increasingly Hiding Behind Activists, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (March 16, 2016); Strine, supra note 31, at 1898 & n.97.  
 201.  Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 
63 J. FIN. 1729, 1742 (2008).  
 202.  Id. 
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E.  De Facto Shareholder Primacy 
Activist interventions, and the larger shadow they cast, are forcing firms 
to adopt the myopic view of shareholder primacy, where shareholder welfare 
is judged by share price regardless of its link to fundamental value.213  The 
changes to board governance that hedge funds advance build on previous 
efforts by institutions and others to reduce managements’ influence over 
boards.  Hedge funds present these more sympathetic boards with proposals 
to increase stock prices. 
Increasing stock prices is, and always is, their goal.214  They pursue it 
regardless of the impact on stakeholders and long-term shareholders.  Which 
is no surprise.  It is, after all, what their own investors demand.  Even though 
hedge funds have no interest in corporate purpose per se, because their 
actions focus solely on immediate stock-price gains irrespective of other 
interests, their actions, when viewed in such terms, compel companies to 
pursue a version of shareholder primacy that ignores long-term 
consequences. 
Activists’ record in generating stock-price gains is mixed.  On the 
whole, hedge-fund activists cause stock-price improvements.215  But not all 
interventions are equally profitable.  Sale of the target reliably generates 
strong returns, but other interventions are less fruitful.216  Some generate 
gains; others losses.217  Just as in stock picking, there are better and worse 
activist investors.218 
Those interventions that do generate above-market gains must do so by 
transferring wealth to short-term shareholders from stakeholders and long-
term shareholders, increasing the intrinsic value of the firm, or through some 
combination of the above.  Although an exact apportionment among these 
potential contributors is impossible, wealth transfers appear to play the 
dominant role. 
All of the substantive changes discussed above move value from 
stakeholders to shareholders.  Selling the target immediately boosts its stock 
price.219  But it does so, at least partly, at the expense of employees.  Although 
explanations for this bump vary, these transactions almost always lead to 
layoffs as redundancies are eliminated.220  When money is returned to 
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shareholders through stock buybacks and dividends, it hurts bondholders and 
lenders because it decreases their capital cushion.  Cuts to R&D hurt 
consumers, who are deprived of innovative products.  Tax inversions and tax 
evasions (even if lawful) shift the burden of funding the government to other 
taxpayers and reduce government resources. 
There are rare cases where the changes are neutral or may even inure to 
stakeholders’ benefit.  As noted above, occasionally interventions lead to cuts 
in executive compensation.221  The savings make money available to the rest 
of the company.  This does not hurt stakeholders, and it could, at least in 
theory, lead to greater employee compensation.  Generally speaking, though, 
while stakeholders may sometimes benefit accidentally from activism, their 
interests are not considered.  As a result, they usually end up on the wrong 
side of the equation. 
Long-term shareholders might similarly suffer.  If stock-prices were 
efficient, this would be impossible.  Rather, the moves would have to benefit 
long-term holders; otherwise the stock price would remain steady or decline.  
For example, layoffs would only lead to stock-price gains if the firm had too 
many employees, not if the cuts were to muscle rather than fat.  Along these 
lines, proponents of hedge-fund activism rely on market efficiency to argue 
that activism benefits all shareholders.222  According to this logic, if returning 
money to shareholders through buybacks or dividends increases the value of 
target firms, it must mean management was holding too much capital; 
companies that were told to cut staff and reduce R&D must have been 
overspending in those areas; gains from mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) 
must come from synergy. 
As discussed above, however, appeals to EMH are uncompelling.223  
There is good reason to believe stock prices largely reflect a short-term 
valuation rather than an intrinsic value that accounts for cash flows stretching 
to infinity.  Further, the claims that activists increase the intrinsic value of 
target firms strains credulity.  Most importantly, activists typically target 
strong performers.224  They tend to be profitable and have steady cash 
flows.225  It seems odd that strong performers would have across-the-board 
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blind spots for the areas that hedge funds target—areas that happen to deliver 
quick stock-price boosts.  Rather, what looks to be happening is that activists 
have identified a set of easily implementable ways to increase stock prices 
given the short-term nature of stock valuations, and then search for 
companies where the changes would generate the greatest return.  Their 
approach is formulaic, not bespoke.226 
Activists are generally not examining companies for ways to improve 
intrinsic value.  If this were the case, then interventions would be sui 
generous.  Hedge funds, for example, look to cut (rather than increase) 
staff227 and R&D.228  If the funds were focused on intrinsic value, there 
should be campaigns that argue for more staff and more R&D.  Also, how do 
hedge fund managers know how much companies should be spending in 
these areas?  They are financial professionals, not experts in target 
businesses.229  More likely, they are looking to make cuts to firm workforces 
and R&D to quickly boost net earnings—a change with an immediate stock-
price impact.230 
Similarly, if activists were long-term oriented, we would see 
interventions that aim to improve long-term operational performance.  They 
might recommend heavy investments in R&D and in generating a loyal 
workforce.  They might push companies to build community ties or to cut 
prices to develop consumer loyalty.  They might even push for a shift in 
strategy.  But this is not what hedge funds usually propose.231  Their proposals 
generally have no relationship to long-term value, only to inputs in short-
term financial models.232  
The nature of activist interventions actually reinforces the inefficiency 
narrative.  If stock prices reflect short-term valuations, then moves that would 
increase the long-term value of the firm would not be captured in current 
stock prices.  They could even lead to stock price declines.  That hedge funds 
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are opting for a short-term agenda suggests that they lack faith that the market 
rewards true value creation. 
Their short-term agenda may actually hurt long-term investors.  If stock 
prices reflect short-term valuations, it is possible for hedge funds to increase 
stock prices while decreasing long-term value, in the process transferring 
wealth from long-term shareholders.  It is easy to see how this might be the 
case.  Giving money back to shareholders might increase stock prices because 
of the wealth transfer from creditors.  But it might hurt long-term holders 
because it leaves the company less resilient to shocks.  Cuts to R&D increase 
short-term profits but make the firm less competitive in the long-term.233  
Layoffs may also hurt.  Net earnings may improve.  Remaining employees 
may even work harder for a time for fear of losing their jobs.  But then 
overworked employees leave, and the firm must incur the large expenses 
associated with recruitment and training.  If stock prices mainly reflect 
expectations for the near future, then the long-term consequences would be 
underpriced.  The price change would be driven primarily by the goosed 
financial statements, even if they are bound to regress in the future. 
In sum, it is clear that activists engineer gains in stock prices.  It is also 
clear that there are wealth transfers from stakeholders.  The degree to which 
stock price gains come from the wealth transfers themselves (and the 
improved financial statements that result) or from increases to the intrinsic 
value of target firms is inextricably linked with the question of market 
efficiency.  If markets are efficient, the interventions must be creating real 
value; if markets are inefficient, then the stock price gains reflect increases 
in short-term values potentially at the expense of long-term shareholders.  
Much evidence suggests that stock prices are inefficient.234  The nature of 
hedge fund interventions also suggests that activists are leveraging 
inefficiency to create stock price moves rather than lasting value.  Therefore, 
while the effect on long-term shareholders cannot be known with absolute 
certainty, it is highly likely that they do not benefit from activism and are in 
fact harmed by it.235 
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Regardless, hedge funds aim for purely stock-price gains.  There is no 
reason to think they care about stakeholders, and, other than blind appeals to 
efficient markets, there is no case that hedge-fund-driven financial 
engineering maximizes long-term value—the form of shareholder primacy 
embraced by commentators and Delaware law. 
F.  The Market Shadow of Hedge Fund Activism 
It is not only targets that act in line with the activists’ agenda.  The idea 
of de facto shareholder primacy is that all firms, not only those that have 
come under attack, are forced to adopt the hedge fund ethos.  No public 
companies are immune from activism.  Activists target hundreds of 
companies a year.236  They target firms big and small.237  Apple,238 
Microsoft,239 and Procter & Gamble240 have all been engaged by activists.  
And these funds have a lot of resources.  At last count, they have $130 billion 
in assets under management.241 
Since every firm is a potential target, and since activist interventions are 
so disruptive,242 management has a significant incentive to take actions to 
deflect their attention.  The best way to do this is to preemptively adopt 
measures activists would push, and more generally, to work to maximize 
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current share prices.243  And this is what corporations are doing.  It is 
increasingly common for companies to engage in hedge fund favorites like 
stock buybacks,244 M&A transactions,245 and spinoffs246 even without an 
activists’ prodding.  They are also spending less on R&D.247  Capital 
investment is at “historic lows.”248  The credible threat of activism is 
fundamentally reshaping the agenda of public companies. 
This is not to say that the forces of de facto shareholder primacy operate 
equally on all companies.  Firms may have traits that give them more space 
to pursue long-term value or stakeholder goals.  For instance, firms with 
broader retail investor ownership, and less of an institutional base, are harder 
for activists to target.249  Since hedge funds tend to engage stronger 
companies,250 weaker companies, somewhat paradoxically, also have some 
slack.  Finally, firms may give public shareholders, including institutional 
investors, diluted voting rights or none at all.251  The unequal voting rights 
reduce the power of activists, or in the latter case, disempower them.  
Although this mode of disempowerment has gained headlines, only ten 
percent of companies reduce public shareholder voting rights,252 and so far, 
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only one company—Snap—has disenfranchised them completely.253  More 
generally, there is a transaction cost boundary on activist activities.  Certain 
corporate practices might not affect share price enough, or in a certain enough 
way, to be worth a fight.254 
The limits to de facto shareholder primacy trace the limits of investor 
protection.  As noted earlier, nobody believes that retail investors actually 
read the disclosures that securities law demands.  Instead, the theory is that 
transparency protects investors indirectly, because everyone trades at a price 
informed by sophisticated trading.255  The strength of this protection varies 
with the degree of institutional interest.  Less institutional involvement 
weakens both de facto shareholder primacy and investor protection.  Their 
heavy presence, however, means that both are powerful forces in the 
securities markets. 
Empirical work supports the link between hedge-fund activism and 
corporate purpose.  In a forthcoming paper, Professors Gartenberg and 
Serafeim measure corporate purpose, defined as “a concrete goal or objective 
for the firm that reaches beyond profit maximization.”256  They find that 
public companies have a lower corporate purpose than private ones257 and 
that, among public firms, those with high levels of hedge-fund ownership 
have a “substantially lower” corporate purpose.258  Their work also suggests 
that corporate purpose declines after hedge funds purchase their shares, 
implying causation.259  These findings directly align with the thesis that 
hedge-fund activism is pushing public firms toward shareholder primacy. 
G.  Why De Facto Shareholder Primacy Is Different 
Hedge fund activism is not the only thing pushing executives to 
maximize stock prices.  But the pressure hedge funds exert is unique.  When 
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confronted by activists, boards and executives face the credible threat of 
removal if they fail to abide.260  In other cases, leadership has far greater 
discretion about how much value to put on share price. 
As noted above, many institutional investors have a short-term focus.261  
Mutual funds are measured each quarter, and active managers might sell if a 
company fails to deliver anticipated returns.262  Such a turn in sentiments 
might trigger a stock-price drop, which might cause the board to fire the CEO.  
Alternatively, if the board does nothing, a competitor or private equity firm 
might launch a hostile takeover.  Like hedge fund activism, fear of 
termination or fear of acquisition should incentivize share-price 
maximization. 
The comparison to activism, however, is superficial.  Boards might or 
might not choose to fire their CEO for an underperforming stock price.  The 
decision is up to the directors, which they are free to make in conformity with 
the company’s chosen corporate purpose.  A board might very well decide 
that current stock prices do not reflect the true value of the CEO or the 
company, in which case they might choose a wait-and-see approach.  The 
board retains discretion over its corporate purpose, and its decision on 
whether to retain the CEO is a function of that choice. 
If the stock price sinks too low, this raises the possibility of a hostile 
acquisition.  In this case, the board and the CEO could be replaced.  These 
are not the threat they seem, however.  Boards can defeat hostile takeovers 
with poison pills.263  While fewer and fewer companies have poison pill plans 
in place, companies can choose to implement them as soon as they come 
under attack.264  These plans make a hostile acquisition nearly impossible, 
and under Delaware law, boards have wide discretion around them.265  The 
deference that courts afford not only undermines this mechanism for tying 
management to stock price; it is also another indication of the corporate-
purpose flexibility corporate law provides. 
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Commentators have also argued that executive compensation pushes 
executives to maximize stock prices.266  This is because they are paid with 
equity, either in the form of stock grants or stock options.  Indeed, these 
compensation schemes were introduced to focus management’s attention on 
stock prices.267  Executive compensation plans, however, often do not reward 
immediate gains.  Options and stock grants vest over time.268  The vesting 
schedule may even cause executives to focus on the longer term.  More 
importantly, executive compensation is different because it is set by the 
board.  The board chooses whether it wants to incentivize its officers in this 
way, whether doing so aligns with their corporate purpose.  A compensation 
scheme that emphasizes share prices is by choice rather than de facto fiat 
through the threat of activism.269 
Finally, the existence of activism itself is proof that these mechanisms 
do not fully align corporate activities and shareholder primacy.  The existence 
of the arbitrage opportunities that draw in activists shows that companies are 
not currently doing all that they can to maximize share prices. 
H.  Hedge-Fund Activism as a Mechanism of De Facto Shareholder 
Primacy 
Hedge-fund activism is discussed and debated as if it was as a stand-
alone phenomenon.  But the institutional context is crucially important for a 
full understanding of how it should be viewed and whether it should be 
constrained.  What has been so far ignored in the debate is that the securities 
laws are necessary for activism and that activists are mechanisms of 
shareholder primacy in the same way that sophisticated institutional investors 
are mechanisms of investor protection. 
If not for the trustworthy comprehensive disclosures public companies 
are forced to make available to everyone, activist hedge funds would lack the 
information to make policy proposals in the first place.  The corporate 
financial statements contained in the mandated disclosures are the building 
blocks of financial analysis, and without access to them, hedge funds would 
have no basis on which to intervene.270  The transparency provided by the 
securities laws is the ground on which hedge fund activism is built.271 
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The crucial role of the securities laws is apparent when the public 
markets are contrasted with the private ones.  In the private markets, there is 
no disclosure requirement.  And companies do not share information with the 
public.272  Rather, they share it only in privately negotiated transactions with 
investors they would welcome as shareholders.273  As a result, hedge-fund 
activism is nonexistent.  Entrepreneurs choose a corporate purpose that suits 
them, and investors who find it agreeable become shareholders.274 
It is only when companies go public, and are required to make their 
finances available to everyone, that they are forced to adopt shareholder 
primacy.  Activism is the mechanism through which the securities laws 
translate to a de facto corporate purpose mandate.  This theory—that hedge-
fund activists are mechanisms of de facto shareholder primacy—has the same 
structure as the predominate theory about how the securities laws protect 
investors.  Each is about how the securities laws, through institutional 
intermediation, impact the securities market.  The conventional story is that 
institutions read disclosures to inform their trading, which protects investors 
as their diligence translates into prices.275  In de facto shareholder primacy, 
institutions, namely activist hedge funds, also rely on the securities 
disclosures.  But they use it to identify suitable targets for intervention.  The 
market pressure translates to homogeneity of corporate purpose. 
Viewing hedge-fund activists as regulatory intermediaries is useful for 
three reasons.  First, it highlights the crucial role that the securities laws play 
in dictating corporate purpose, something that has gone unrecognized.  As 
noted above, while corporate law theoretically embraces shareholder 
primacy, it does not do so in practice, because, most of all, the business 
judgment rule is so deferential.276  In contrast, the securities laws are 
theoretically about investor protection.  In practice, however, the securities 
laws have become the primary regulatory apparatus driving shareholder 
primacy.  Despite the enormous amount of attention that corporate purpose 
has received from corporate law scholars, it is actually securities law that now 
demands it. 
More broadly, the relationship of the securities laws to corporate 
purpose shows that these laws  are much more closely connected to corporate 
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law than previously understood.  The aspects of the securities laws that 
dictate corporate governance, like those requiring that public companies have 
majority independent boards and fully independent audit and compensation 
committees, have been recognized as pushing into corporate law’s territory.  
These rules are sometimes even referred to as federal corporate law.277  What 
scholars have failed to recognize is that all of securities law impacts corporate 
governance.  Although corporate leadership is inherently better informed, 
securities-law disclosures close much of the information gap between 
shareholders and management that exists under corporate law.278  The 
securities laws thus empower public shareholders at the expense of insiders.  
Collective action problems meant that this power long went unused, but the 
institutionalization of the securities markets has greatly reduced this 
barrier.279  Today, securities law fundamentally alters the nature of public 
firms—complementing, and as I argue further below, supplanting key aspects 
of corporate law.280  
Finally, recognizing the role of securities law reframes the debate about 
hedge-fund activism.  As I flesh out in Part III, it transforms the debate into 
one over the proper scope of the securities laws rather than over whether 
market actors engaged in a disruptive and innovative new practice should be 
constrained.  Similarly, because hedge-fund activists transform the securities 
laws into a de facto shareholder primacy regime, a critique of de facto 
shareholder primacy is also a critique of hedge-fund activism.  The debate 
about activism today focuses on implications for shareholder welfare at target 
firms.281  Linking hedge-fund activism to the securities laws and to the advent 
of de facto shareholder primacy provides a much broader perspective on the 
implications of their activities. 
I.  Critique of De Facto Shareholder Primacy 
De facto shareholder primacy forces public companies to maximize 
share price regardless of the preferences of the board, management, or the 
principles on which the corporation was founded.  This outcome contravenes 
core tenets of corporate and securities law and the federalist principles that 
divide them.  In doing so, it hurts entrepreneurs and investors, and weakens 
securities markets.  
De facto shareholder primacy unravels the structure of corporate law.  
Corporate law is enabling.  It sets default rules, but leaves the outline of the 
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corporate structure—including corporate purpose—to private ordering.282  
When they incorporate, founders can choose whatever lawful purpose they 
wish.283  If, as is commonly the case, a company incorporates in Delaware, 
but leaves corporate purpose unspecified, then Delaware law nominally 
requires that management maximize long-term shareholder value.  The legal 
standard for judging compliance is so deferential, however, that, in practice, 
management has broad discretion to run the firm as it pleases.284  The 
securities laws eviscerate this flexibility. 
Moreover, under corporate law, boards run corporations.  Shareholders 
have little power.  The legal structure situates shareholders as passive owners 
with little say over the firm’s business or purpose.285  The securities laws 
reverse this power structure.  Boards are at the mercy of shareholders, and 
the most influential have rallied behind the activist agenda.286 
Worse still, corporate law is implicitly about public corporations.  The 
legal structure it sets up is meant to function when there is a separation 
between management and shareholders—the hallmark of public 
companies.287  Securities law thus eviscerates core features of corporate 
law—its enabling stance toward corporate purpose and its insulation of the 
board—in the exact area where it is targeted. 
Securities law, and the transparency it affords, was never supposed to 
upend corporate law.  The law’s aim was to foster informed financial 
transactions, not impact firm operations.288  The famous securities-law 
aphorism, “[s]unlight is . . . the best . . . disinfectant[],” suggests that the 
requirement to disclose should lead to more ethical behavior.289  And this was 
likely part of the motivation for the securities laws, but disclosure is not 
meant to alter the fundamentals of corporate operations or purpose.290  In 
response to the rules, firms are expected to disclose material aspects of their 
businesses, not change what they do or why they do it.  That the securities 
laws bring de facto shareholder primacy thus contravenes foundational 
aspects not only of corporate law, but also of securities law. 
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Principles of federalism go by the wayside as well.  By federally 
imposing a corporate purpose, the securities laws deprive the states of their 
longstanding jurisdiction over the matter.291  Stepping past that boundary is 
particularly problematic when it comes to corporate purpose. 
Generally speaking, federalist principles dictate that federal law should 
govern when uniformity is desired.292  In general, federal securities regulation 
makes sense because it is a nightmare for companies to comply with fifty 
different state securities law regimes.293  If, however, it would be better to 
allow states to serve as laboratories of experimentation, then the matter 
should be left to the states to allow for competition and innovation.294 
Corporate purpose fits squarely in the latter category.  This is an area 
where there is currently a great deal of innovation.  The widespread adoption 
of benefit corporation statutes is one example.  The first was in Maryland in 
2010,295 and the form of doing business is now available in thirty-six states.296  
There also does not appear to be any harm to leaving this to state courts and 
legislatures.  Sometimes, for example, uniformity is desired because there is 
a concern with a race to the bottom.297  But that is not an issue here.  The 
boundaries of corporate purpose are perfect for the state level trial-and-error 
process of legal development. 
Rather than allow for experimentation, the securities laws have 
unintentionally created corporate-purpose clones.  This result weakens 
securities markets, and harms both entrepreneurs and investors.  Securities 
markets are diminished when firms have the same corporate purpose.  In 
particular, if a firm focuses only on stock price, it might lead to riskier 
behavior, which jeopardizes its long-term prospects.  Stock buybacks, for 
example, reduce a firm’s capital cushion, making it more susceptible to 
shocks.  The securities laws provide an overwhelming incentive to take this 
risk.  De facto shareholder primacy deprives the market of diversity of 
corporate purpose, diversity that would provide a cushion if firms devoted to 
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share-price maximization stumble.  The market—and the economy—is 
therefore less resilient. 
The rigidity is also bad for entrepreneurs.  Unless they have the clout 
and hutzpah to issue low-vote or no-vote shares to the public, founders who 
wish to maximize stakeholder value or long-term shareholder value cannot 
go public without sacrificing this purpose.  There is no reason for regulation 
to cut entrepreneurs off from this means of capital raising and deprive them 
of the other benefits of going public.  Indeed, there is much debate about why 
the public markets have become less attractive.  Many blame the monetary 
costs of being a public company.298  But perhaps this fundamental change 
that happens when a company goes public is a bigger factor.299 
Retail investors are the final victims.  They may wish to back companies 
that have a stakeholder focus or care about long-term value.  These firms 
exist in the private market.300  But private firms may only sell stock to 
institutions and accredited investors.301  Retail investors can only invest in 
public firms, but these must adhere to de facto shareholder primacy.  This is 
particularly problematic for the many mutual-fund investors who put money 
in these instruments to fund their retirement.  De facto shareholder primacy 
might lead to a short-term boost in their returns, but the long-term is 
uncertain.  They may even give aspiring retirees a false sense of security.  
Although it is counterintuitive, the shift in power to shareholders is likely bad 
for many shareholders. 
The only sure beneficiaries of the returns bump that results when firms 
take actions to boost stock prices are the hedge funds that lobby for them. 
While their wealth is part of the social-welfare equation, the range of negative 
consequences suggests that reform is appropriate. 
III.  A NEW LENS FOR HEDGE-FUND ACTIVISM 
This Article has shown that the securities laws underpin hedge-fund 
activism and therefore also underpin de facto shareholder primacy.  
Recognizing the role of the securities laws is important to the debate on 
activism because it shifts the perspective of the regulatory analysis and 
allows for a more fulsome consideration of its societal costs.  A 
comprehensive weighing of the costs and benefits of hedge-fund activism 
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suggests that activists are a drag on social welfare and that securities-law 
reform is, therefore, appropriate. 
A.  The Cost-Benefit Framework 
The critical policy question raised by the critique of de facto shareholder 
primacy is whether activist hedge funds should be constrained.  The way to 
approach this question is through cost-benefit analysis.  This is the core 
analytical framework for judging the probity of regulatory intervention, and 
it is required of the SEC.302  If hedge-fund activism is viewed as a free-market 
innovation (rather than an unintended consequence of regulation), then 
regulators would have to show that the costs of activism outweigh its benefits 
before undertaking regulatory efforts. 
The notion that hedge-fund activism is an independent phenomenon is 
implicit in the current debate about activism,303 as is its corollary, that a 
showing of net harm is a precondition to regulation.304  This Article shows 
that these premises are incorrect.  Rather, hedge-fund activism is a product 
of the securities laws.  Since the securities laws should not support activities 
of questionable social value, activism itself must withstand cost-benefit 
scrutiny.  The burden should be on the hedge-fund industry, not regulators.305 
Another way to see why the burden should be on industry is to imagine 
that regulators foresaw the potential for the securities laws to be used to 
support activism and considered whether it would be good public policy for 
them to be used in that way.  The regulatory analysis would assess whether 
the benefits of activism outweigh the costs.  If not, the securities laws would 
be drafted to avoid supporting it.  That the securities laws only came to 
support the activity well into their existence, mainly as a result of market 
innovations rather than rule changes,306 should not alter the policy analysis.  
This is a common problem in economic regulation.  Rules are static; markets 
are dynamic.  As markets change, regulations must be reassessed so that they 
continue to provide a net benefit to society.  Here, if the securities laws are 
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supporting an activity that cannot be shown to improve social welfare, they 
should be changed. 
B.  The Social-Welfare Calculus 
Though hard numbers on the costs and benefits of activism are illusive, 
on balance, hedge-fund activism is likely harmful for society.  The real-world 
harms to entrepreneurs, investors, and the economy that stem from de facto 
shareholder primacy can be viewed as the costs of activism.307  These must 
be weighed against the benefit—the amount of wealth that activists create.308 
This figure is not equivalent to the increase in stock prices at target firms 
and in firms that take similar actions as a way to ward off the activist threat.  
Three discounts need to be applied to account for the possibility that much, 
if not all, of the stock-price bump results from wealth transfers.309 
First, as noted above, much of the wealth creation owes to transfers from 
stakeholders.310  This is true regardless of whether stock prices reflect short- 
or long-term valuations.  Laying off an employee, regardless of that 
employee’s productivity, is a wealth transfer from the employee to 
shareholders.  All else being equal, stock prices will rise to reflect this 
reallocation.  But the transfer to shareholders only increases social welfare if 
the money is more valuable in the company’s hands than the employees’.  
The transfer itself creates no value.311 
Second, much of the gains from activism comes from M&A transactions 
where the target firm is sold.312  Typically in such transactions, a decrease in 
the share price of the acquired firm accompanies the increase in stock price 
at the target.313  Thus, at least part of the M&A gains come from wealth 
changing hands from shareholders of the acquiring firm to shareholders of 
the target. 
Finally, the stock-price increase might reverse over time.  If prices 
reflect only short-term valuations, then there is a good chance that the rise 
reflects a transfer from long-term shareholders.  As discussed above, the 
nature of the hedge-fund interventions suggests that the changes they push, 
                                                          
 307.  See supra Section II.E. 
 308.  This Article uses the total surplus approach to cost-benefit analysis, which seeks to measure 
the welfare impact on society rather than certain parties.  See Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency 
Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor Welfare or Total Surplus?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 103 
(2015).  
 309.  See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 
933 (2015) (discussing how “[c]anonical economic theory” treats transfers). 
 310.  See supra Part II.E. 
 311.  See id. 
 312.  See Allaire, supra note 197, at 34, 42; Strine, supra note 31, at 1944. 
 313.  See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1424-
25 (2007); Strine, supra note 31, at 1945–46. 
 
2020] DE FACTO SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 697 
like cuts to R&D, fall into this category.314  While it is impossible to know 
just how much of the increase in stock prices is owed to transfers from 
stakeholders, acquiring-firm shareholders, and long-term shareholders, there 
is good reason to believe that they represent the bulk of the pop.315 
Whatever is left represents true value—an increase to shareholder 
wealth after subtracting out transfers.  This amount can be compared to the 
manifold problems—from stymied entrepreneurs and investors to unstable 
markets—that de facto shareholder primacy creates.  While it is beyond the 
scope of this Article—if feasible at all—to put hard numbers to this 
weighing,316 a qualitative balancing suggests that the benefits of activism do 
not outweigh the widespread and significant costs.317  This suggests reform. 
C.  Reforms to Eliminate Hedge-Fund Activism 
This Article has shown that the securities laws unintentionally force 
companies to adopt share-price maximization as their corporate purpose and 
that this de facto shareholder primacy requirement is probably bad for social 
welfare.  The policy implication is, therefore, that reforms should be 
considered to free companies from this weight.  The way to unburden them 
is to restrain hedge-fund activism.  There is a way to end the practice that 
builds on the existing structure of the securities laws. 
Currently, investors are required to report their holdings and material 
plans for the firm once they have acquired five percent of a target company’s 
shares.318  If this rule were changed to require reporting before any 
acquisition with the intent to intervene in firm affairs, it would remove the 
profits from activism.  Because much of the stock-price bump from activism 
occurs when the intervention is disclosed,319 the activist gains would 
evaporate.  Deprived of the vast majority of their profits, there would be no 
incentive to intervene.  This is a simple change that could come directly from 
the SEC.320 
The biggest counterargument to this proposal is that it goes too far.  It 
eliminates all of hedge-fund activism even though there is the potential that 
some provides long-term benefits to shareholders.  As noted above, however, 
it is unlikely that this is a large loss.  It is quite difficult and risky to make 
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money from long-term bets,321 and the evidence strongly suggests that 
activists, by and large, are looking for a quick boost.322 
A related argument is that ridding the market of hedge-fund activists 
would provide management with too much slack.323  As a result, they would 
be able to prioritize their own interests rather than that of the firm.  This 
argument is also unconvincing.  First, it presumes that stock prices are an 
accurate way to police slack.  If management is looking to maximize 
stakeholder interests, then stock price is only a partial metric.  If management 
is looking to maximize long-term value, then stock price is a deeply noisy 
metric.  Management may be looking out for long-term interests, which 
might not be reflected in stock prices, or might even be punished.324  Second, 
even if stock price is an accurate measure of management performance, 
corporate leadership has ample incentive already to focus on it.  As noted 
above, executives are commonly compensated with equity;325 they also face 
pressure from institutional investors worried about short-term 
performance.326  Finally, if there is truly a concern that management is not 
responsive enough to share price, then this is an issue for corporate law.  That 
is where the balance between management and shareholders has always been 
struck.327  The overriding influence of securities law—an instrument of 
investor protection—is an accident. 
A final argument is that hedge-fund activism should be left to private 
ordering.  First, institutional investors might stop supporting them.  Second, 
companies can adopt dual-class share structures to choke off the activists’ 
influence.  Despite promising rhetoric, the hope that institutional investors 
will turn away is fanciful so long as they chase short-term returns.328  And 
dual class shares go too far.329  Placing a regulatory constraint on activism 
leaves in place every other form of shareholder engagement, while dual-class 
shares eviscerate them all. 
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If hedge-fund activism were curbed through the recommended 
disclosures, then there would be no mechanism for de facto shareholder 
primacy.  Although firms might still choose to focus their efforts on share-
price maximization, it would not automatically follow from going public.  
Firms would have the ability to change and adapt, and to incorporate and be 
more receptive to a broader range of interests.  The benefits of this restored 
flexibility would flow through to securities markets, securities-market 
participants, and to the economy. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This Article introduces the concept of corporate purpose to securities 
law.  In doing so, it shows that the legal regime unintentionally compels firms 
to maximize share price regardless of the implications for long-term 
shareholders, let alone stakeholders.  This world of de facto shareholder 
primacy hurts investors, entrepreneurs, and the overall economy. 
Hedge-fund activism is the mechanism of de facto shareholder primacy.  
Based on the insights they glean from the required disclosures, hedge funds 
demand share-price maximizing actions of target management.  Fear of proxy 
contests drives targets to consent; fear of activist intervention leads all firms 
to act like they are already targets. 
The way to disentangle the securities laws from corporate purpose is to 
curb hedge-fund activism.  The way to curb hedge-fund activism is to require 
that funds announce their planned acquisitions and interventions before 
purchasing target securities.  Demanding that hedge funds disclose so early 
would eliminate the profit potential from engagement, thus ending the 
practice.  An end to hedge-fund activism, and the concomitant end to de facto 
shareholder primacy, would give firms the freedom to pursue other corporate 
purposes.  Given the crucial role of corporations in society, this flexibility 
would have far-reaching benefits. 
